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Canonical Defamation in 
Medieval England 
by R. H. HELMHOLZ* 
It is a commonplace of legal history to say that defamation was 
a spiritual offense in medieval England.' Slanderous words gave 
rise to a cause of action in the ecclesiastical courts. This article is 
meant to supply some information on that action as it appears in 
the surviving records of England's Church courts. One of the dif- 
ficulties of most modern treatments of the subject is that they must 
rely heavily on the rules of the royal courts about the proper sphere 
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.2 That is the theme of the early Year 
Book cases. But it is necessarily second-hand evidence. Substantial 
numbers of actual Church court records are available, although 
they are unprinted and scattered in archives throughout England. 
It seems worthwhile to make use, even if it must sometimes be a 
tentative use, of their testimony on the actual working of the law of 
defamation in the Church courts. 
Discussion of the substantive law may be prefaced with some 
statistics. Absolute certainty as to how far any figures are represen- 
tative is, of course, impossible to obtain. The extent of record sur- 
*Department of History, Washington University, St. Louis. 
1. E.g., ". .. le cas de diffamation est tout spirituel offence, qui ne 
poit auterment estre puni forsqe la." Y.B. Trin. 12 Hen. VII f. 24b (1497). 
See also Y.BB. Trin. 17 Edw. IV, f. 4, pl. 2 (1477); Mich. 27 Hen. VIII, 
f. 14, pl. 4 (1535). For modern comments see W. Holdsworth, A History 
of English Law, 5th ed. (London, 1942), v. 3, p. 410-11; F. Pollock and 
F.W. Maitland, The History of English Law, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1968), 
v. 2, p. 536-37; C.H.S. Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law, 
Tort and Contract (1949), 126-28; E. Garth Moore, An Introduction to 
English Canon Law (1967), 4; S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of 
the Common Law (1969), 333-35. 
2. In addition to the references given above, see Van Vechten Veeder, 
"The History of the Law of Defamation," Select Essays in Anglo-American 
Legal History (1909), v. 3, p. 446-73; J.C. Courtney, "Absurdities of the 
Law of Slander and Libel," 36 American L. Rev. 552-64 (1902). But cf. 
A.K.R. Kiralfy, A Source Book of English Law (1957), 391-400, which 
contains translations of ecclesiastical records. 
255 
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vival is too spotty. But what has survived suggests that defamation 
cases were always a significant part of litigation in the English 
Church courts. In the Consistory court of Rochester, for example, 
seventeen of ninety cases heard in 1438 were actions for defama- 
tion.3 Between Michaelmas 1491 and the same term in 1493, the 
official principal of Hereford heard twelve such suits, out of a total 
of 176.4 At Lichfield in the years 1465 through 1467 forty-five of 
259 actions introduced were defamation actions.5 And the Can- 
terbury Commissary Court heard eight of these suits in 1373, out 
of a total number of 113.6 Defamation actions thus never repre- 
sented the major item of business. But they were a regular and 
important part of canonical litigation throughout the later medieval 
period. 
The legal foundation for these actions of defamation was, in 
the Province of Canterbury, a constitution enacted by the Council 
of Oxford in 1222.7 
Excommunicamus omnes illos qui gratia odii, lucri, vel 
favoris, vel alia quacunque de causa malitiose crimen imp- 
onunt alicui, cum infamatus non sit apud bonos et graves, ut 
sic saltem ei purgatio indicatur vel alio modo gravetur. 
We excommunicate all those who, for the sake of hatred, 
profit, or favor, or for whatever cause, maliciously impute a 
crime to any person who is not of ill fame among good and 
serious men, by means of which at least purgation is awarded 
to him or he is harmed in some other manner. 
A variant version was adopted in the diocese of York, but it did not 
3. Taken from Kent County Record Office, Maidstone, Act book 
DRb/Pa 1. 
4. Episcopal Archives, Cathedral Library, Consistory Court Act book 
I/ 1. 
5. Joint Record Office, Lichfield, Act book B/ C/ 1/ 1. 
6. Dean and Chapter Library, Canterbury, Act book Y.1.1. Numbers 
of defamation suits increased in the fifteenth century; from the middle of 
the century there were usually fifty a year. See B. Woodcock, Medieval 
Ecclesiastical Courts in the Diocese of Canterbury (1952), 88. Dr. R.W. 
Dunning has calculated that defamation suits came to about one-fifth of 
the total in the Wells Consistory court; see "The Wells Consistory Court 
in the Fifteenth Century," Proceedings of the Somersetshire Archaeo- 
logical and Natural History Soc., Vol. 106 (1962), p. 59. 
7. F.M. Powicke and C.R. Cheney, eds., Councils and Synods with 
other Documents relating to the English Church, II, A.D. 1205-1313, 
(1964) v. 1, p. 107. For medieval commentary, see W. Lyndwood, Pro- 
vinciale V, 17, c. Auctoritate Dei Patris (Oxford, 1679), 345-48. 
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differ in any legally important aspect.8 Court records show the 
uniform application of this remedy. English formularies invariably 
give documents based on the Oxford constitution.9 And the libels 
and sentences from the court records show the same use of the 
provincial or diocesan action.'" 
A particularly interesting case comes from the late thirteenth 
century Canterbury records. The complainant apparently had 
brought his original action at the papal court. As was normal, this 
resulted in the delegation of papal jurisdiction to a local cleric, in 
this case an English prior. The rescript of delegation, specifying 
the terms of law by which the prior was to decide the case, did not 
mention the constitution of Oxford. But the libel in the actual trial 
was quite specific. The defendant was alleged to have fallen "in 
sentenciam maioris excommunicationis in consilio Oxon' contra 
tales diffamatores latam." 11 Even here, the Provincial constitu- 
tion provided the framework for the hearing. The wording of that 
constitution determined the scope of the remedy for defamation 
available in the English Church courts. 
All defamation actions had, therefore, to be based on the pre- 
cise wording of the constitution. It determined, in the first place, 
what words were actionable. The statute specified that the language 
must have imputed a crime to the complainant. The cases bear this 
out. It was defamatory to call someone a thief, as in a London action 
where a man said, "Thow art the woman that stolest the kyetyll from 
8. Councils and Synods, I, 496 for York; II, 820 for Durham, which fol- 
lows the Southern model. 
9. The precise language of the Constitution is repeated in these 
formularies: British Museum, Reg. II A XI, fols. 6v-7r; Harl. MS. 2179, 
fols. 65v-66r; Inner Temple Library, London, Petyt MS. 511.3, f. 106v; 
Dean and Chapter Library, Canterbury, MS. D 8, f. 9r. 
10. A typical sentence in a defamation action begins: "Idcirco nos com- 
missarius antedictus solum Deum pre oculis habentes, prefatam Johan- 
nam Pope in maioris excommunicationis sentenciam contra huiusmodi 
diffamatores in constitutione provincie Cant' que sic incipit ex auctoritate 
dei patris etc. . . . incidisse pronunciamus et declaramus." Canterbury, 
Act book Y.1.5, f. 47v (1456). York documents speak of falling "in maioris 
excommunicationis sentenciam contra huiusmodi diffamatores latam et 
promulgatam auctoritate constitutionis synodalis Ebor'." Borthwick 
Institute, Cause papers R VII F 100 (1431). Cause papers are the formal 
documents used in the course of litigation, recording the pleadings, the 
evidence, and the judgment. As presently arranged at the Borthwick 
Institute, each file, with a few exceptions, contains the papers for a 
separate case. See J. Purvis, The Archives of York Diocesan Registry, St. 
Anthony's Hall Publications, No. 2 (1952), 13-14, 
11. Canterbury, Ecclesiastical Suits, No. 70 (1288). 
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the Old Swan." 12 It was actionable to name another man as a 
"public perjurer", as in a Canterbury case from 1373.13 Like- 
wise, imputation of forgery,14 of heresy,'• of manufacturing 
false evidence,'6 of adultery,'7 of procuring the death of an 
innocent man1' were all actionable. 
On the other hand, it was not defamatory to call a woman a 
"scalde", since this involved no crime.19 Nor apparently was the 
mere insult of naming another "serviens unius rustici" without 
more.20 Some of the phrases one finds in the court books were 
doubtless nothing but common insults. To shout that a woman was 
12. Guildhall Library, London, Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 204r 
(1494). Allegations of theft were frequently the basis for defamation suits. 
Examples are: Canterbury, Act books Y.1.3, f. 148v (1420); X.1.1, f. 129v 
(1457); Rochester, Act book DRb/ Pa 2, f. 64r (1447); Hereford, Act book 
0/2, p. 31 (1442); York, Cause papers R VII E 170 (1364); R VII F 27 
(1406); Depositions and other Ecclesiastical Proceedings from the Courts 
of Durham from 1311 to the Reign of Elizabeth, ed. J. Raine, Surtees Soc., 
Vol. 21 (1845), 27. 
13. Act book Y.1.1, f. 25r: "fuit perjurius publicus in depositione sua 
in causa matrimoniali." 
14. Canterbury, Ecclesiastical Suits, No. 70 (1288); York, Cause papers 
R VII F 100 (1431): "usus fuit in emptione et venditione falso auro et lege 
regis reprobato." 
15. London, Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 215v (1494); Norwich, Nor- 
folk Record Office, Deposition book DEP/ 1, f. 14v (1500): '"Thow art an 
heretik and a Lollard." 
16. Rochester, Act book DRb/ Pa 1, f. 123v (1439): "imponendo ei 
quod ipse falsas evidencias fabricasset." 
17. Ely, "Registrum Primum," Cambridge University Library, EDR 
D/ 2/1, f. 21v (1375): "imponendo sibi crimen adulterii." Canterbury, 
Sede Vacante Scrapbook III, No. 270 (1290); York, Minster Library Court 
Book M 2 (1)f, f. 27r (1389); Act Book of the Ecclesiastical Court of 
Whalley, ed. A.M. Cooke, Chetham Soc., Vol. 44, N.S. (1901), 17-20. 
18. York, Cause papers R VII E 59 (1347). 
19. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.1, f. 22v (1372). In this case, proceedings 
were suspended and a day assigned ad concordandum when the com- 
plainant could allege only this word as defamatory matter. Ordinarily a 
day would have been assigned ad libellandum. But cf., for two apparently 
contrary cases, Acts of the Collegiate Church of SS. Peter and Wilfrid, 
Ripon, A.D. 1452 to A.D. 1506, ed. J.T. Fowler, Surtees Soc., Vol. 64 
(1874), 2, 58. And for some post-Reformation cases, see R.A. Marchant, 
The Church under the Law; Justice, Administration and Discipline in the 
Diocese of York, 1560-1640 (1969), 71-74. 
20. York, Cause papers R VII E 72 (1356). In this case, although the 
record is not unambiguous, proceedings seem to have continued only after 
the complainant added to the original allegation. She noted that the de- 
fendant had also called her meretrix sacerdotis. 
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a "strong harlot" was probably no more than a term of general 
abuse.21 But the words technically included a crime punishable 
in a public court. Therefore they were enough to give rise to a 
claim for defamation. Words which were merely abusive were not. 
It was not necessary, however, that the crime be actually 
named or unequivocally stated. If the words implied the commis- 
sion of a crime, this was enough. The doctrine of mitior sensus 
which complicated the early Common Law remedy found no place 
in the canon law courts.22 To say, for example, "I see a monk at 
the door of the priory of Rochester who did not lie in his own bed 
that night," while a monk was standing in the doorway, gave rise 
to a cause of action in a Rochester case of 1462.23 It implied the 
monk's incontinence. Similarly, for a man to say that he had found 
a woman "lying together with Richard Porter in a barn with the 
doors closed," was enough to allow the woman to sue for defama- 
tion. That the words could be construed to imply something other 
than fornication was apparently no defense.24 In an interesting 
York case from 1424, Thomas More was cited for claiming to have 
spoken with 'the spirit of a dead man. The spirit had ordered him, 
he claimed, to tell the dead man's son to restore property wrong- 
fully taken from More. This had been sufficient, it seems, to have 
given rise to common fame that the dead man had stolen the goods. 
To clear the dead man's name, More was required to do public pen- 
ance during divine service. He had to announce to the local congre- 
gation that he had falsely defamed the dead man.25 
Considerable latitude was thus allowed in the degree of spec- 
ificity with which the crime had to be named. Because of this fact, 
the canonical remedy for defamation covered a broader range of 
insulting words than might at first appear. The number of human 
21. The term is many times repeated in the late fifteenth century 
London records. See Guildhall, Act book MS. 9064/ 1 (1470-73). 
22. On this rule, under which defendants sought to escape liability by 
claiming that their words could technically be construed so as not to con- 
stitute a crime, see Milsom, Historical Foundations, 338; Prosser, Hand- 
book on Torts ?106 (3d ed., 1964), 764. 
23. Act Book DRb/ Pa 3, f. 442r: It is worth noting that the defendant 
sought unsuccessfully to claim lack of specificity: "Fatetur quod talia 
dixit, sed quod non nominavit aliquam personam in specialem." 
24. Rochester, Act book DRb/ Pa 4, f. 304v (1496): "inveniebat eam 
in orreo simul cum Ricardo Porter iacentem suspective et clausis hostiis." 
25. York, Borthwick Institute, Act book R VII Cons. AB 2, f. 40v (1424). A somewhat similar case, in which the slander originated with 
a woman who was dead at the time of the action, is referred to in a letter 
from Henry Dispenser, bishop of Norwich from 1370 to 1406; see M. 
Dominica Legge, ed., Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions, Anglo- Norman Text Soc., Vol. 3 (1941), 383-84. 
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actions punishable as crimes of some sort in medieval England was 
considerable. Allegations of professional incompetence were un- 
fortunately not included. Only very rarely would they have included 
a crime. And I have found no examples in the surviving Act books. 
This must be counted as one of the real lacks in the Church court 
action. But the allegation of criminal conduct, in actual practice, 
still embraced a large amount of the defamatory language of daily 
life. 
No distinction was made between crimes punishable by the 
secular courts and those punishable by the Church. The royal 
courts were developing the rule that if the crime were one they 
alone could try, a writ of prohibition would lie.26 Under this doc- 
trine, defamation in the ecclesiastical tribunals would be limited 
to the imputation of distinctly spiritual crimes--heresy, adultery 
and the like. Allegations of theft and homicide could not be dealt 
with by the Church courts. But, whatever the developed Common 
Law rule, ecclesiastical practice did not conform to it in the Middle 
Ages. All crimes were treated alike in defamation actions.27 And 
the court records show negligible numbers of prohibitions inter- 
rupting suits for defamation. The Church courts went their way 
largely unmolested in this area. 
English Common lawyers had an apparently good reason for 
allowing a royal writ of prohibition where the imputation was of 
a purely secular crime. Without such a prohibition, they reasoned, 
a canonical action for defamation could be brought against a man 
who had accused another of a crime in the royal courts. To subject 
such an accuser or indictor to a defamation action was surely an 
abuse. It was an indirect attack on the royal courts themselves. A 
statute of 1327 and several cases found in the Year Books and plea 
rolls can be found prohibiting the practice.28 
26. Y.BB. Trin. 22 Edw. IV, f. 20, pl. 47 (1483); Mich. 27 Hen. VIII, 
f. 14, pl. 4 (1535); Co. Lit. 96 b. In one fourteenth century formulary, 
beside the forms for defamation by calling another a thief is written in 
a later hand: "Quere an hodie curia ecclesiastica de hiis diffamacionibus 
cognoscat." London, Inner Temple Library, Petyt MS. 511.3, f. 35r. 
27. See also Woodcock, Medieval Ecclesiastical Courts in the Diocese 
of Canterbury, 88. 
28. I Edw. III, st. 2, c. 11. In a case from 1358, for example, a prohibi- 
tion issued to stop ecclesiastical proceedings against jurors for their 
verdict in a royal court. London, Public Record Office, K.B. 27/392, 
Rex m. 18. See also: W.R. Jones, "Relations of the two Jurisdictions: 
Conflict and Cooperation in England during the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries," Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 
VII (1970), 201-202; H. Potter, An Historical Introduction to English 
Law and its Institutions (1932), 360. 
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But it is another question whether the ecclesiastical courts 
habitually entertained such abusive actions. The Constitution of 
Oxford specifically required that the imputation be made mali- 
ciously. Lyndwood, glossing that word, gave it as a rule that accusa- 
tions made and proved in the course of legal proceedings did not 
fall within the wording of the Constitution.29 By definition, they 
were not made maliciously. He drew no distinction between secular 
and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Neither, it would seem from Lynd- 
wood's treatment, would give rise to a defamation action. 
The actual court records, while not so full here as one could 
wish, suggest that Lyndwood's rule was observed in practice. In a 
Rochester defamation action brought for imputation of theft, the 
complaint was dismissed when the defendant showed that his only 
offense consisted of having brought an action for wrongful conver- 
sion against the complainant.30 In another case, an archdeacon 
sued for defamation successfully pleaded that his accusation of 
adultery against the complainant had been made in the course of 
a judicial action. He had been merely carrying out his duties.31 
There is a case from York in 1364 where an action for defamation 
was allowed after a secular prosecution for theft. But it was also 
shown that in the secular court the complainant had established 
his innocence. Notwithstanding that fact, the defendant had re- 
peatedly uttered his accusations of theft. He was apparently dis- 
satisfied with the judgment vindicating the complainant. Here the 
Church court allowed a remedy.32 
This is not to say, of course, that no actions based on the pre- 
vious indictment or suit at Common Law were ever entertained in 
the ecclesiastical courts. Surely they were. Lyndwood's gloss does 
in fact leave room for actions against an unsuccessful accuser 
who acted out of malice towards an innocent man. But even leav- 
ing this case aside, one must recognize that the procedure of the 
Church courts could be used against innocent men as well as the 
procedure of the royal courts. Complicated court systems nearly 
always leave room for abuse. But the requirement of malice was an 
attempt, within the canon law itself, to deal with that abuse. And 
29. Provinciale, V, 17, c. Auctoritate Dei s.v. malitiose: "Quia vocat 
quis aliquem latronem, perjurum, homicidam, vel adulterum, et hoc dicit 
in judicio per viam accusationis, vel dununciationis, et id probaverit, 
non incidit in hanc poenam." 
30. Act book DRb/Pa 2, fols. 246r-246v (1454): "Et quantum ad 
crimen furti, dicit quod non imposuit sibi crimen furti nec aliquid dixit 
maliciose de eodem, sed peciit et vendicavit unum flameolum quod fuit 
uxoris sue et quod idem Willelmus habuit quo iure ignorat." 
31. Canterbury, Sede Vacante Scrapbook III, No. 270 (1290). 
32. York, Cause papers R VII E 170. 
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 13:04:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
262 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XV 
the records do not indicate that the Church encouraged large num- 
bers of actions against Common Law indictors. It is dangerous to 
take the Common Lawyers' objections to a practice, and to draw 
the conclusion that the practice was the norm in the Church courts. 
For the legal historian, it is noteworthy that defamation by 
prior judicial action was excluded from coverage by the Oxford 
constitution's requirement of malice. The necessity of malice in the 
later Common Law remedy, as modem commentators often note, 
has given rise to considerable difficulties, not wholly resolved by 
legal fictions developed over the course of time.33 It would be 
rash, until more research has been done on the growth of defama- 
tion in the royal courts, to say categorically that this requirement 
came into English law by way of the canon law. I can do no more 
than suggest that English law may have included the requirement 
of malice because it incorporated this part of the canonical action. 
It is at least a strong possibility. 
To say this, of course, attaches no blame to the canon law 
remedy. The requirement of malice was not at all out of place in 
the Church courts. Since, as we shall see, the punishment of the 
defamer was varied according to his guilt and to the degree of harm 
he had caused, it was quite relevant for the judge to know with 
what malice a defendant had acted. In a London case of 1495, for 
example, we learn that after accusing a woman of giving birth to 
a priest's child, William Strome immediately thought better of it. 
He apologized for his words. He asked for the woman's pardon.34 
Or, to take the opposite case, in the York court one defendant was 
said to have remarked after his initial accusation, "What I saw I 
wish to say and never to deny." 35 In another case, it was rele- 
vant that the imputation had been made repeatedly (iteratibus 
vicibus) and not just in the heat of anger (non tantum calore ira- 
cundie).36 All these were important in assessing the serious- 
ness of the ill fame, the extent of its spread, and the proper remedy 
for its public correction. 
According to the Oxford constitution, the complainant in a 
defamation action had to show some sort of harm. At least, it reads, 
33. See, for example, the interesting article "Slander and Libel," 6 
American L. Rev., 593-613 (1872), in which the doctrine of legal malice 
is called, at 610, "pure scholasticism." And see, for early history, W. 
Holdsworth, "Defamation in the 16th and 17th Centuries," 41 L. Q. Rev. 
(1925) 24-28. 
34. Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 227v. 
35. Cause papers R VII E 171. 
36. Cause papers R VII F 61 (1411). 
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 13:04:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1971 CANONICAL DEFAMATION 263 
he must have been put to a canonical purgation as a result.37 In 
practice, such a purgation often became merely a preliminary to a 
defamation action. A man, alleging that a crime had wrongfully 
been imputed to him, came before the judge and "asked to purge 
himself of that crime." 38 Or a judge might assign purgation 
because of widespread public fame.39 If the defamed person suc- 
cessfully purged himself, an action for defamation, tried like any 
other instance case, could begin. This sort of purgation was an 
entirely normal part of canon law where there was public fame of 
a crime.40 The English action for defamation built on that proce- 
dure. 
In practice then, no actual damages had to be shown where 
purgation was used. But allegations of actual damages were by no 
means uncommon. They were again relevant to assessing the 
amount of harm done and the proper way of restoring a complain- 
ant to good fame. Thus we find in the libel and articles claims that 
the words had "caused the complainant to lose his goods," ' or 
that he had "sustained several labors, expenses and vexations on 
account of the imposition of this crime," 42 or that a woman's 
husband had "refused to admit her to his bed as he was accustomed 
to" 43 on account of the slanderous words. 
Conversely, defendants sometimes answered that no damage 
had in fact occurred. In a York case of 1356, for example, it was 
said that the complainant was "of no worse fame after the utterance 
than before." 44 As this suggests, the most frequent defense to 
defamation actions was the existence of prior defamation. If a man 
had been previously and publicly reputed to be guilty of the same 
37. On this see the discussion in Lyndwood, Provinciale, V, 17, c. 
Auctoritate Dei s.v. ut sic. 
38. Lincoln, Diocesan Record Office, Court book Cj/1 (1493-1504), f. 
18r; Canterbury, Act book Y.1.3, f. 148v (1418). 
39. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.2, f. 10r (1397), Hereford, Act book 0/2, 
31 (1442); Rochester, Act book DRb/Pa 2, f. 175v (1452). 
40. See X 5.34.1, 5, Corpus Juris Canonici, ed. A. Friedberg (Leipzig, 
1879-81). 
41. London, Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 27v (1487): "Causaverunt 
ipsum perdere bona sua." 
42. Ibid., f. 88r (1490): "sustinuit nunnullos labores expensas et 
vexaciones pretextu imposicionis huiusmodi criminis." 
43. Canterbury, Ecclesiastical Suits, No. 318 (c. 1290): "'dictus 
dominus Robertus maritus suus eo pretextu noluit ipsam ut uxorem ad 
lectum suum aliqualiter admittere . . . prout prius consuevit." 
44. Cause papers R VII E 72: ". . . fama et status dicte Alicie non 
sunt multum lesi nec in aliquo deteriorati. . . . quia non audivit eam 
ut dicit reputari per aliquos deterioris fame post quam fuerat ante." 
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crime, then the act of repeating the rumor did not fall within the 
Constitution. It required that the ill repute have originated with the 
defendant. And thus we find defenses like this one: "These words 
did not have their origin (from him); but common voice and fame 
held these things long before he uttered the words." 45 Lynd- 
wood remarked on the frequent use made of this defense in the 
Church courts. He noted that it led to unfortunate results, since it 
allowed a man to greatly augment the extent of publication, to en- 
large the damage caused, and then to escape punishment by plead- 
ing prior defamation.46 The cases do not, unfortunately, reveal 
to what extent the judges overcame this difficulty. Lyndwood's 
words suggest that they did not. 
To turn now more directly to the question of punishment or 
damages, we are met with a second instance of possible dispute 
over jurisdiction. The writ, or so-called statute, Circumspecte 
Agatis (1286) limited the Church courts to spiritual penalties in 
defamation. No money damages were to be available.47 An 
opening was, however, left open. After a successful prosecution, a 
defendant might receive a corporal penance, then redeem it for 
a money payment. But it had to be according to his wishes, not 
consequent upon a formal sentence by the judge.48 Otherwise, 
the action could be prohibited by the royal courts. 
So far as the ecclesiastical records indicate, this limitation 
was followed in practice. No money damages, beyond the expenses 
normal in canonical litigation, were awarded in the formal sen- 
tences. Nor were they demanded in the libels. Public penance and 
45. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.3, f. 171r (1421); York, Cause papers R 
VII E 59 (1347); and see the formula for raising the defense: British 
Museum, Reg. 11 A XI, f. 60r. 
46. Lyndwood, Provinciale, V, 17, c. Auctoritate Dei s.v. unde: "Si 
prius fuerit infamatus super eodem crimine, tunc non haberet locum ista 
poena, et sic practizant multi, qui ad evadendum hanc poenam dicunt, 
quod prius fuit infamatus super eodem crimine sibi imposito: sed mihi 
videtur quod ista litera non sit bona, et propterea quod practica non sit 
bona." 
47. Statutes of the Realm, I, 101; Councils and Synods, II, 974-75; 
and see E.B. Graves, "Circumspecte Agatis," English Historical Rev., Vol. 
43 (1928), 1-20. 
48. "In diffamacionibus libere corrigant prelati non obstante pro- 
hibicione, primo iniungendo penam corporalem quam si reus redimere 
velit libere recipiat prelatus pecuniam licet regia prohibicio porrigatur." 
Statutes of the Realm, v. 1, p. 102. 
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other "spiritual" penalties alone are detailed in the remaining 
documents. 
Whether this is a direct consequence of the availability of a 
writ of prohibition is not entirely clear. The Constitution, it should 
be remembered, spoke only of the excommunication of an offender. 
It offered, in other words, only a spiritual penalty. It can thus be 
argued that the canon law remedy gave no direct money damages 
in the first place. Of course, this is true in a sense of all canonical 
actions. Excommunication was the severest penalty in the canon 
law.49 Even in actions brought to enforce contracts, the suits for 
breach of faith which filled the English Church courts in the Mid- 
dle Ages, the sanction for refusal to fulfill a contract was always 
excommunication. But it may be that there were special reasons 
within the canon law itself for limiting defamation actions to spir- 
itual penalties. Quite apart from the limitations of the English law, 
there were practical reasons for avoiding the routine award of 
damages in the formal sentences. 
First, a formal excommunication followed by informal bar- 
gaining about restitution to the injured party in exchange for the 
lifting of the sentence was an entirely suitable way of handling 
defamation cases. The number of variables in these actions was 
very large. There was something to be said for leaving the question 
of restitution and penance open, as the Constitution did. Then, 
after the sentence of excommunication, could come discussion of 
under what circumstances the sentence should be lifted. This 
might involve a money payment to the complainant, or it might not. 
But in any case, the penance or damages would be in return for 
the lifting of a sentence of excommunication. This was in harmony 
with both Circumspecte Agatis and the canon law of defamation. 
It cannot, of course, be absolutely proved that this is what nor- 
mally happened. Any bargaining about penance and its commu- 
tation which went on was not made part of the record. It is beyond 
recall. But certainly it is fair to say that the rules about damages 
imposed by the royal courts did not conflict directly with the eccle- 
siastical law of defamation itself. The Constitution of Oxford did not 
promise money damages. As such, the limitations of Circumspecte 
Agatis may not have been so stringent or restrictive of the Church 
courts as is sometimes said. 
Second, the use of a broad range of "spiritual" penalties was 
actually a strength of the ecclesiastical courts' handling of defama- 
tion cases. At least this is true if one compares it to the later Com- 
mon Law action. One of the handicaps of the modern law of libel 
49. On this and the English Church's privilege of demanding capture 
of excommunicates by royal justice see F.D. Logan, Excommunication 
and the Secular Arm in Medieval England (1968), 13-15. 
This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Fri, 25 Apr 2014 13:04:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
266 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XV 
and slander is that it is limited to money damages.50 Though 
courts today may consider the degree of fault by the defendant and 
the nature of harm to the plaintiff in assessing a proper amount of 
recovery, they are still, so to speak, stuck with strictly monetary 
damages. These are often of extreme difficulty to assess accurately. 
And they are sometimes quite other than what a plaintiff really 
needs or desires. What he wants is a public vindication of his 
reputation, an official declaration of his innocence and a public 
admission of error by the defamer. He wants, in short, a restoration 
to the good opinion of the community. No doubt, in the conditions 
of modern society, anything but money damages are impossible. 
But as a tool to restore a man's tarnished reputation, they are a 
blunt instrument indeed. 
The ecclesiastical remedy in the Middle Ages, whatever its 
other limitations, fulfilled this function better than the later Com- 
mon Law action. Sometimes, we find in the records, the complain- 
ant was content with a simple sentence of the court upholding his 
innocence. The judge "restored him to good fame." ~' Church 
courts were, by and large, local courts, and in a small community, 
where gossip moved freely and spread quickly, a simple sentence 
was sometimes enough. If necessary, an oath by the defendant 
might be added. He was occasionally obliged to swear publicly 
that he would not repeat the scandalous charge.52 In some 
cases this oath was backed by a guarantee of a money penalty to 
ensure future good behavior.53 
50. On this see Alec Samuels, "Problems of Assessing Damages for 
Defamation," 79 L. Q. Rev., 63-86 (1963). See also E.C.S. Wade, 
"Defamation," 66 L. Q. Rev., 348-57 (1950). Wade in fact suggests, at 
354-56, the adoption of some of the same sorts of remedies used in the 
medieval Church courts. 
51. E.g., "Dominus commissarius declaravit se bene purgatum, male 
diffamatum et restituit eum bone fame quantum in se fuit." Canterbury, 
Act book Y.1.3, f. 15v (1415). A similar formula is found in the British 
Museum formulary, Harl. Misc. 2179, f. 68v. 
52. E.g., Canterbury, Act book Y.1.3, f. 54v (1417): "iurata est dicta 
Matilda de loquendo omnem honestatem de dicta Margareta in futuro." 
Canterbury, Act book Y.1.4, f. 103r (1422): ". . . quod habeat se honesto 
tam in verbis quam in gestura erga vicarium." See also London, 
Deposition book MS. 9065, f. 70r (1490). 
53. In a case from 1417, the defendant was ordered not to defame the 
complainant in the future under penalty of twenty shillings, a third of 
which was to go to the defamed person, a third to the parish church, 
and a third to the prior of Canterbury, in whose court the action had 
been heard. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.3, f. 200v. In a York action of 
1400, the same oath was ordered, the penalty again being twenty 
shillings. York, Minster Library Court book M 2 (1) f, f. 32r. See also 
Acts of the Collegiate Church of SS. Peter and Wilfrid, Ripon, 46-47. 
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In some defamation actions, the remedy was more elaborate. 
The order from a York case, for example, called for the defendant 
"at the time of High Mass, the parishioners being present (to) say 
in a loud and intelligible voice that he had erred in his words, 
which were uttered from false information of others, and (to) 
humbly ask pardon" of the complainant.54 In a Hereford action, 
the defendant had again to publicly ask pardon during divine 
service and to say "that he had uttered the words out of evil will, 
not from zealousness, and that he had been moved by anger." 55 
It is not romanticism, I think, to suggest that penalties such as 
these more effectively restored an injured reputation than the 
award of money damages would have. Perhaps many litigants 
would have preferred a pecuniary penalty. But that is not neces- 
sarily a criticism of the canonical action. Its aim was to punish un- 
just slander and to undo its effects, not to reward the avarice of 
litigants. 
Most defamation cases, however, never reached the stage of 
sentence and penance. I have no exact figures, but certainly the 
large majority ended in compromise and agreement. The notation 
"pax" written alongside a case in the Act book marked a frequent 
end.56 The continuance "sub spe concordie" was another.57 
A concord could be admitted even after formal sentencing where 
the parties had reached subsequent agreement.58 The Church 
courts were never concerned to push defamation actions through to 
formal sentence. No special license to concord was demanded. 
One of the principal goals of any legal system must be to bring 
quarrelling people to amicable settlement. Surely this is true where 
insulting and damaging words have been the substance of the 
quarrel. So far as the court records indicate, it was this goal which 
54. ". . . quod tempore celebracionis maioris misse, parochianis 
congregatis, alta et intelligibili voce, dicat ipsum erronee huiusmodi 
verba per ipsum alias dicta ex falsa informacione aliorum dixisse et 
quod veniam postulet humiliter ab eodem." Borthwick Institute, Act book 
R. As. 55, f. 6v (1497). In another York case the defendant had to stand 
at the altar and say, "Ago pro eo quod Aniciam Stenys de Ebor nequiter 
diffamavi, a qua peto benevolenciam pro commissis." Act book R VII 
Cons. A B 2, f. 45v (1425). 
55. ". . . quod veniret tempore alte misse ad pulpetum et ibidem 
publice peteret misericordiam a dicto domino Johanne et quod 
protulisset huiusmodi verba ex mala voluntate et non ex bono zelo, sed 
iracundia motus fuisset." Act book 0/2, 50 (1442). 
56. Lichfield, B/C/1/1, f. 39v (1465); Hereford, Act book 0/2, 20, 69 
(1442); Ely "Registrum Primum," f. 80r (1378). 
57. Rochester, Act book DRb/Pa 1, f. 27r (1437); Canterbury, Act 
books Y.1.1, f. 51r (1373); Y.1.3, f. 54r (1417). 
58. Canterbury, Act book Y.1.4, f. 112v (1423). 
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predominated in the Church courts in defamation cases. The 
Common Law limitation to purely spiritual punishment did not 
severely hamper the Church courts in this task. And it was a task 
of some consequence and value. 
It is too soon, as Professor Milsom has recently noted, to write 
the full history of early defamation at Common Law.59 A good 
deal is already known, of course.60 But only the painstaking 
examination of the early sixteenth century plea rolls will tell the 
story of the development of the secular remedy. The process will 
certainly have to be studied against the background of the canon 
law action outlined above. Comparison with canonical practice 
should illuminate the process by which the royal courts assimilated, 
or half-assimilated, the ecclesiastical action. It may be that some 
of the defects and anomalies of the Common Law remedy existed 
solely because they were taken over whole from the canon law.61 
Even if this is true, however, it will not prove an equal weak- 
ness in the canonical action. That action was by no means perfect 
from a strictly legal standpoint. The failure to include allegations 
of professional incompetence and the too ready availability of the 
defense of prior defamation must be counted as faults in the law. 
But, when this has been said, the records tell a largely positive 
story. The Church courts took in a large class of defamatory lan- 
guage, they considered a broad range of evidence, and they made 
available a varied set of remedies. The records, examined here, 
suggest that the Church courts provided a useful remedy for men 
injured by harsh and insulting words. 
59. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 334. 
60. See Holdsworth, History of English Law, v. 5, p. 205-12; C.R. 
Lovell, "The Reception of Defamation by the Common Law," 15 
Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1051-71 (1962). 
61. It seems likely, for example, that the distinction between libel 
per se and libel per quod can ultimately be traced to the canon law, 
although the categories naturally underwent changes over the course of 
time. But the early Common Law limited defamation per se to cases of 
accusations of crimes (along with professional incompetence and a few 
serious contagious diseases), and this may be because the canonical 
remedy was taken over. Holdsworth concluded that categories other than 
crimes were developed subsequently; see History of English Law, v. 8, 
p. 348-49. See also Milsom, Historical Foundations, 337-38. 
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